Introduction
Values are central to public discourse today. Competing groups demand priority for the values they hold dear, arguing that conflicting values are unworthy. Theorists have long considered values central to understanding attitudes and behavior (e.g., Allport, Vernon and Lindsay, 1960; Kluckhohn, 1951; Williams, 1968) . They view values as deeply rooted, abstract motivations that guide, justify, and explain attitudes, norms, opinions, and actions (cf. Feldman, 2003; Halman and de Moor, 1994; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) .
In practice, survey researchers distinguish little between values and attitudes (Halman and de Moor, 1994: p.22 ). The confounding of values and attitudes reflects, in part, the absence of a comprehensive theory of the basic motivations that are socially expressed as values. It also reflects the lack of reliable, theory-based instruments to measure basic values (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Rohan 2000) .
In 1992, Schwartz introduced a theory of basic human values, building on common elements in earlier approaches (e.g., Rokeach 1973) . It includes ten motivationally distinct values presumed to encompass the major value orientations recognized across cultures. He also presented a first instrument to measure these values that he validated cross-culturally (Schwartz, 1992 ). An alternative instrument, also validated across cultures, was presented in 2001 (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris and Owens 2001) . This theory and two instruments have promoted a revival of empirical research on relations of values to attitudes and behavior, both within and across cultures (overviews in Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Schwartz 2005a,b) . Recently, the European Social Survey (ESS) incorporated a third, short instrument to measure the ten basic values in its semi-annual studies of attitudes and opinions. The 2006 pilot study of the American National Elections Survey also includes a version of the values instrument. This article briefly describes the theory of basic values and the ESS instrument, and then assesses the adequacy of this instrument for measuring values within and across countries.
Political attitudes and choice are one important domain to which basic values are relevant (e.g., Knutsen, 1995; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Rokeach, 1973; Zaller, 1992) . Values may enable people to organize their political evaluations in a relatively consistent manner; they may provide a general structure to political attitudes (Feldman, 2003) . This structuring process is one path through which values may influence political preferences. Converse (1964) likened values to "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs." Schwartz (1994) argued that systematic variations in the priority individuals give to different basic values underlie political ideologies. Thus, values may influence political choice through their effects on ideologies.
The particular values that structure ideological discourse and underlie political choice depend upon the issues that are central in a given political context. Consider three examples of studies based on the Schwartz (1992) theory and instruments. In the Israeli political arena of 1988, protection of religious practice competed with free expression of a secular life style. There, the key values that differentiated party supporters were tradition versus self-direction (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998) .
In the Italian elections of 2001, the center-right placed particular emphasis on entrepreneurship and the market economy, security, and family and national values. In contrast, the center-left advocated social welfare, concern for social justice, equality, and tolerance of diverse, even potentially disruptive groups. The basic values that related significantly to political preferences were security and power (right) vs. universalism and benevolence (left) (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, and Barbaranelli, 2006) .
In a study of political preferences in 14 countries, Barnea (2003) found two main patterns. Where political competition revolved around issues of national security vs. equal rights and freedoms for all, the key values that structured voters' preferences were security and conformity vs. universalism and self-direction. Where the focus of political competition revolved around the distribution of material resources, the key values were universalism and benevolence vs. power and achievement.
Other studies have revealed systematic relations of basic values to a wide variety of attitudes and opinions in many countries, using one or another of the Schwartz instruments. For example, basic values exhibit predicted associations with attitudes toward war, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes and Kielmann, 2005) ; attitudes toward human rights (Spini and Doise, 1998) ; interpersonal trust, political activism, and attitudes toward immigration (Schwartz, 2007) ; environmental attitudes (Schultz and Zelezny, 1999) ; and materialism (Burroughs and Rindfleisch, 2002) .
Not only are individual differences in basic value priorities important, but the prevailing value emphases in societies also relate systematically to national differences in widespread attitudes and public policy (Schwartz, 2006b (Billiet 2003) . We employ multiple group confirmatory factor analyses augmented with mean-structure information (see Sörbom 1974, and Sörbom 1978) on the data from the first round of the ESS to address these issues.
The Theory of Basic Values
Before presenting the ESS values scale and assessing its validity, a brief overview of the theory from which it derives is necessary. The theory defines values as desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. It derives ten, motivationally distinct, broad and basic values from three universal requirements of the human condition: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups (Schwartz 1992 (Schwartz , 2005a The schematic circular structure in Figure 1 intermix in empirical studies. Thus, the theory specifies the motivational order of value items around the circle and it suggests distinguishing 10 value constructs for scientific convenience. The theory leaves the width of the value constructs and the absolute distances among them unspecified, hence the width of the slices in Figure 1 is arbitrary. The self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence dimension opposes power and achievement valuesthat emphasize self-interest-to universalism and benevolence values-that entail concern for the welfare and interests of others. The openness to change vs. conservation dimension opposes selfdirection and stimulation values-that emphasize independent action, thought, and feeling and readiness for new experience-to security, conformity, and tradition values-that emphasize self-restriction, order, and resistance to change. The dashed lines around hedonism indicate that it shares elements of both openness to change and of self-enhancement.
Research with two earlier instruments provides evidence supporting this structure in samples from 67 nations (Fontaine et al. forthcoming; Schwartz 2005a,b; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004) . Although individuals differ in the importance they attribute to various values, the same motivational structure apparently organizes these values across cultures. These studies provide no strict tests of measurement invariance, however. The current study subjects the new ESS human values scale to such tests.
The ESS Human Values Scale
The ESS Human Values Scale is derived from the earlier 40-item Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz, et al. 2001; Schwartz 2005b Table 2 presents the format of the survey and, below, in the first two columns, the items, grouped by type of value. Two portraits operationalize each value, with three for universalism because of its very broad content. The score for the importance of each value is the mean response to the items that measure it. Translation into each native language followed procedures explained in Harkness, Van de Vijver and Mohler (2003; Ch. 3) . Table 2 . Absent invariance, observed differences in means or other statistics might reflect differences in systematic biases of response across countries or different understanding of the concepts, rather than substantive differences (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998) . Equally important, findings of no difference between countries do not ensure the absence of "real" differences.
Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA: Jöreskog 1971) is among the most powerful techniques for testing measurement invariance. 4 We draw upon the Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998) procedural guidelines for facilitating assessing measurement invariance in cross-national studies with a confirmatory factor analytic approach. We follow a step-wise procedure from the least to the most demanding form of invariance.
The lowest level of invariance is 'configural' invariance, which requires that the items in an instrument exhibit the same configuration of loadings in each of the different countries (Horn and McArdle 1992) . That is, the analysis should confirm that the same items measure each construct in all countries in the cross-national study 5 . Configural invariance is supported if a single model specifying which items measure each construct fits the data well in all countries, all item loadings are substantial and significant, and the correlations between the factors are less than one. The latter requirement guarantees discriminant validity between the factors (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).
Configural invariance does not ensure that people in different countries understand each of the items the same way. Although the same items form a factor that represents each construct, the factor loadings may still be different across countries. The next higher level of invariance, 'measurement' or 'metric' invariance, assesses a necessary condition for equivalence of meaning. This level requires that the factor loadings between items and constructs are invariant across countries (Rock, Werts and Flaugher 1978) . It is tested by restricting the factor loading of each item on its corresponding construct to be the same across countries. Measurement invariance is supported if this model fits the data well in a multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis.
categories rather than the usual five in Likert scales. Although the Proportional Odds Model (POM) technique has more statistical power (low type II error) than MGCFA, recent studies suggest that POM has an inflated type I error, and that MGCFA is more flexible (Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Billiet 2002; Welkenhuysen-Gybels 2004) . 5 The test allows sequentially adding cross-loadings if indicated by the program so long as the same cross-loadings are allowed across all countries.
Configural and metric invariance are tested by examining information only about covariation among the items. A third level of invariance is necessary to justify comparing the means of the underlying constructs across countries. This is often a central goal of cross-national research. Such comparisons are meaningful only if the items exhibit 'scalar' invariance (Meredith 1993; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998) . Scalar invariance signifies that crosscountry differences in the means of the observed items result from differences in the means of their corresponding constructs. To assess scalar invariance, one constrains the intercepts of the underlying items to be equal across countries, and tests the fit of the model to the data.
In sum, meaningful comparison of construct means across countries requires three levels of invariance, configural, metric and scalar. Only if all three types of invariance are supported, can we assume that scores are not biased and confidently carry out mean comparisons. We adopt a 'bottom-to-top' test strategy, starting with the weakest constraints and proceeding to the most severe. This enables us to establish first whether even weak forms of invariance are absent. We test all countries together because theory implies that the measurement model should hold for them all.
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Data Analysis
The data analysis starts with 20 separate CFAs. This is followed by a simultaneous MGCFA in order to assess configural invariance. We then modify the model slightly, following the modification indices that are compatible with theory, in order to specify an acceptable model that is invariant across the 20 countries. Next, we conduct metric and scalar invariance tests.
Finally, we test for invariance of the structural covariances across countries (which is not a necessary condition for the comparison of means).
First, we computed a Pearson (product moment) intercorrelation matrix plus standard deviations for each country. We then converted these into covariance matrices as input for estimating the confirmatory factor analyses. We used pairwise deletion for missing values because, with fewer than five percent missing values as observed here, pairwise deletion is better than listwise and is adequate (see Brown 1994; Schafer and Graham 2002) . In order to solve the problem of the non-positive definite covariance matrices 8 of the constructs, we unified the pairs of strongly associated values. (Schafer and Graham 2002) . Therefore, the gain from using full information maximum likelihood for the problem of missing values is minimal here. Comparing our results with the FIML procedure produced no differences in the unstandardized regression coefficients until the third place after the comma. 8 The problem of non-positive definite covariance matrix of the constructs means that some constructs are associated to each other so strongly that they cannot be separated.
61 pairs of value constructs that were unified across the 20 countries, 59 are pairs of values that are adjacent in the value circle of the Schwartz theory (Figure 1 ). Thus, they represent closely linked motivations and do not violate the theorized circular motivational structure. They do, however, suggest that the ESS value scale may not capture all of the fine-tuned distinctions in the theory. pairs of values were very highly intercorrelated, power with achievement, conformity with tradition, and universalism with benevolence. This produced a problem of non-positive definite matrices of the constructs. The high intercorrelations indicated that the pairs of values were too close to be modeled separately. We therefore unified each pair into a single construct to form
seven distinct values that we tested in all subsequent analyses. Following these modifications, the various fit indices indicate a fit between the model and the data that is satisfactory for not rejecting a model according to Hu and Bentler (1999) and Interestingly, all the modifications introduced in models 2-4 entail adding paths between single indicators and motivationally opposed latent factors that were formed by combining two 9 Because of the large number of cases, the chi square values are very high.
value constructs. The negative paths indicate that the association between the opposing latent value constructs did not capture all of the opposition for three items. The positive paths indicate that these associations overestimated the opposition for two items. The need for these modifications may be due to the reduction from ten original factors to seven. For example, the unified power-achievement latent construct yielded an overall association with the conformitytradition construct that required adding positive paths for the two power items. In the theorized motivational circle of values, power is closer to conformity-tradition than achievement is. We would therefore expect the power items to correlate less negatively with conformity-tradition than the achievement items with which they were combined. Perhaps, had the number of indicators in the ESS scale not been reduced to two per construct (three for universalism), permitting retention of all ten factors, the added paths would not have been necessary. The items with added paths based on the modification indexes are at the bottom of the table. Table 6 about here
The third step of the multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis tests for scalar invariance, a necessary condition for comparing value means across countries. This step of MGCFA is augmented with mean-structure information (see Sörbom 1974, and Sörbom 1978) 11 .
It constrains the intercepts of the indicators in the model, in addition to the factor loadings between the indicators and the constructs, to be the same in all of the countries. If the factor loadings and the intercepts are invariant, one can legitimately compare value means. Where scalar invariance holds, value means should be computed as parameters of the SEM model and not from composite scores calculated from the observed variables. This is because SEM controls for measurement errors of the observed indicators (Sörbom 1974 As noted above, the value theory does not specify the distances of the value constructs from one another around the circle. As a further question, we asked whether the pattern of distances is the same across countries. We tested this possibility by constraining the covariances among the factors to be the same. The fourth row in Table 5 The findings of the current research justify employing the human values scale in survey research for numerous purposes. One can examine change in value scores across time as an indicator of fundamental societal change in response to historical, demographic, and social 15 The current research reveals the levels of configural, metric, and scalar invariance of the ESS values instrument only in the countries studied here. One cannot generalize from this to future studies in these or other countries. Such studies should repeat the current analyses to reassess invariance. The statistical method presented here can establish necessary conditions for equivalence of meaning. Cognitive interviews offer a supplementary tool to assess the equivalence of meaning of the values instrument in various countries.
structural developments (e.g., impacts on peoples' basic values of wars, dropping birthrates, and inflation). Values, measured with the ESS scale may also be used to understand differences among national populations in their responses to government policies (e.g., toward immigration) and to major events (e.g., terror attacks). Future studies may also address the way different values mediate the effects of individuals' socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., age, education, occupation) on their attitudes and opinions (e.g., prejudice against out-groups, trust in institutions). Schwartz, 2005b Schwartz, , 2006a Schwartz, , 2007 . Researchers can now test whether these and other patterns of value/attitude and value/behavior relations generalize across countries. If they find differences between countries in relations of value priorities to attitudes and behavior, the evidence for meaning equivalence makes it legitimate to seek explanations for such country differences.
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Without establishing configural and metric invariance, as done in the current research, none of the above applications of the ESS human values scale could be undertaken with confidence. This study provides the critical legitimacy for such comparative work-evidence for
In studies that relate individuals' values to other variables, it is crucial to correct individual differences in use of the response scale, as explained in Schwartz (2003, p.275) and Schwartz (2006a) . The ESS website describes procedures for making this correction (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/). equivalence of the meanings of the values across countries. As interdependence among nations increases, such comparative work becomes more and more important. Indeed, the problem of meaning equivalence applies to within country studies of diverse ethnic groups as well. The current research can serve as an example of what needs to be done to assess equivalence of meaning , rather than to assume it, as has been typical in comparative survey research. * RMR = root mean square residual; NFI = the Bentler-Bonett normed fit index; CFI = the comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; PCLOSE = probability of close fit; AIC = the Akaike information criterion; BCC = the Browne-Cudeck criterion; df = the number of degrees of freedom. For details see for example Arbuckle (2005) . * RMR = root mean square residual; NFI = the Bentler-Bonett normed fit index; CFI = the comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; PCLOSE = probability of close fit; AIC = the Akaike information criterion; BCC = the Browne-Cudeck criterion; df = the number of degrees of freedom. For details see for example Arbuckle (2005) . ** The RMR index is not provided by the program Amos when means and intercepts are estimated. . In order to set the metric for a factor, it is necessary to fix the factor loading of one of the indicators to one. The last 5 rows indicate the path coefficients added to the original model in the modification process.
